Sada-e-Watan Sydney ™
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Afghan war
can't be won by foreigners
By:
Benjamin Gilmour
(Benjamin Gilmour is the Australian director of the 2008 feature film Son of a Lion, set on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.)
FOOTAGE of roadside
ambushes and rocket attacks such as the one that killed Australian soldier
Gregory Sher in Afghanistan last week might seem like macabre subject matter.
But DVDs of these attacks on foreign troops are hot sellers in the bazaars of
Pakistan's tribal areas where, it is claimed, the Taliban provide al-Qa'ida with
a haven.
US missiles fired into Pakistani territory, along with commando raids in the
past year, have fuelled rebellion and support for Islamic militants even among
moderate, secular Pashtuns on both sides of the border.
According to Mohammad Khan, my friend and fixer for the film Son of a Lion,
everyone - regardless of whether they agree with the Taliban ideology - despises
foreign troops in southern Afghanistan. This includes those who accept bribes
and foreign aid there, those who inform on Taliban positions for money to feed
their starving families, and even members of the Afghan National Army who,
according to Khan, "could turn their weapons on NATO troops at any time". This
hatred is not surprising when, for example, Australian troops are accused of
barging into village compounds and firing on civilians, as it's claimed happened
in Oruzgan on January 5, the day after Sher's death. Ordinary Pashtuns are
routinely armed and will defend their homes. This does not make them combatants.
Just before the closure of the historic Khyber Pass last month after a series of
attacks on NATO's supply lines, Kevin Rudd dropped into Oruzgan to express
sympathy for our young men and women having to spend Christmas in such a
"godforsaken part of the world", which he also described as a hellhole. Those
who have spent any time in that part of the world will know that Afghanistan is
not at all godforsaken. The majority of Afghans practise Islam peacefully, most
pray to God five times a day and have historically lived by the moderate Hanafi
and mystical Sufi doctrines.
How arrogant of us, given our hedonistic society riddled with depression,
alcoholism and failed relationships, to describe Afghanistan as a godforsaken
hellhole.
The Afghans, more than anyone, believe they have God on their side. Perhaps
that's why they're winning the war.
Rudd's other comment to our Diggers, that "the Australian people are behind
you", was also mistaken. Despite public calls from the likes of University of
Sydney academic Peter Khalil and retired Australian Army general Jim Molan for
more foreign troops, the most recent Lowy Institute opinion poll (September
2008) showed a majority of Australians - 56 per cent - did not support the war
in Afghanistan. How convincing, then, are the arguments to remain there, let
alone to commit more troops?
Khalil believes that if the international community fails in Afghanistan, the
consequences will hit our shores, promoting the flawed assumption that unless we
go and fight terrorists on their own turf, we will surely be targeted. In fact,
the most comprehensive study of suicide attacks, by Robert Pape of the Chicago
Project, found that 95 per cent of these attacks have the same specific
strategic goal: to cause an occupying state to withdraw forces from a disputed
territory. So the opposite is true: by remaining an unwelcome element in
Afghanistan, we are potentially making ourselves a target for terrorism. Recent
statistics showing a 20per cent to 30per cent increase in Afghans fighting with
the Taliban proves that our war is counterproductive. We are, in fact, fighting
not the "evil" Taliban but a Taliban-led insurgency. It is what I keep hearing
from Afghans in Australia, in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Our enemy has become
the common Afghan, struggling for his freedom from foreign intervention, as he
has always done.
This kind of widespread resistance movement for which the Pashtuns are famous
simply cannot be beaten. Does Molan, who has boasted about his perceived
successes in Iraq, truly believe that doubling the 120,000 foreign and local
troops in Afghanistan can achieve what almost a half million Soviet and local
loyalist troops failed to do in the 1980s? A string of invaders before them also
failed. His confidence in success based on our "moral superiority" is misplaced,
because the Pashtuns believe the same thing. They will have their freedom from
foreign intervention or die. In contrast to Molan's views, former US secretary
of state and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Colin Powell, interviewed on
CNN, expressed doubt that more troops would make a difference in Afghanistan.
But we're trying to help them, aren't we? Or could it be that while trying to
protect the innocent and deliver aid, we are inadvertently making matters far
worse?
It is, in fact, a surprise to many to see the Taliban receive such popular
support in Pakistan's tribal areas. This is where the vast majority of people
voted against Islamist parties at the February 2008 elections, where people tend
to be more loyal to their ancient code of conduct than Islamic doctrine, and
where the local mullah can often be the most unpopular man in the village.
According to my filmmaking colleagues, who provide me with constant updates, the
rapidly growing support for the extremists is a direct result of intensified
foreign interference. Locals claim our presence is confounding their own
resistance against these radicals.
We are, it appears, our own worst enemy. The thousands of extra US troops due to
land at Bagram this year will, predictably, inspire even greater resistance.
Across the border, where every young boy once dreamed of joining the Pakistan
army, teenagers can't wait to sign up for suicide missions. Local army
operations in the tribal belt to flatten entire villages in collective
punishment, cross-border raids by US forces and Hellfire missiles from Predator
drones hitting civilian targets are all great terrorist recruitment triggers.
By failing to make allies of Pakistan's frontier tribes and those in southern
Afghanistan, we have missed the chance to help create unwelcome conditions for
extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Since completing Son of a Lion in 2007, one of our actors has been shot and
killed, another kidnapped, while our production car was destroyed by an
explosion in which its owner and his son also died. And yet, after all this, a
group of extras from the film has left to join the Taliban.
This once again reminds me that the violence Pashtun tribes are suffering at the
hands of foreign forces will, instead of destroying the extremist minority,
spread and strengthen its ideology. A war on terror will forever feed itself. We
are better off ceasing our cat-and-mouse games with the Taliban and
strengthening the Pashtun tribal institution instead. It may not be the style of
democracy we wish to install, but it comes pretty close.
